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ABSTRACT
Rising powers have often been characterised as ‘reluctant’ when it 
comes to their contributions to global governance. However, also within 
their regions they have sometimes pursued indecisive, mud-
dling-through policies, including in the field of security. This paper 
addresses the puzzling issue of rising powers’ reluctant approach to 
regional crisis management. It conceptualises reluctance as entailing 
the two constitutive dimensions of hesitation and recalcitrance, and it 
seeks to approach a theorisation of reluctance that focuses on a com-
bination of international expectations and domestic preference forma-
tion. The empirical analysis addresses instances of regional crisis 
management by the democratic rising powers India and Brazil during 
phases of domestic political stability under the Modi (2014–2018) and 
the Lula (2003–2011) governments, respectively. The analysis of India’s 
crisis management efforts in Afghanistan and Nepal, and of Brazil’s 
leadership of the MINUSTAH mission and its approach to the civil war 
in Colombia, reveal that reluctance emerges if a government is faced 
with (competing) expectations articulated by international actors as 
well as with a range of domestic factors that lead to unclear preference 
formation.
Introduction: reluctant powers?
Great expectations have been associated with the emergence of ‘new’ powers in world pol-
itics since the beginning of the twenty-first century. Such expectations have come primarily 
from policy makers, who have expected rising powers to contribute to the provision of global 
public goods, given their success in terms of economic growth, their increasingly proactive 
foreign policy and their claims for great power status.1 Academic debates have to a certain 
extent reflected this kind of discourse, with scholars discussing rising powers’ often limited 
contributions to global governance – think of rising powers’ insistence on common but 
differentiated responsibilities on climate governance or of their ambivalence on global crisis 
management. As Bisley suggests in this special issue, this might be due to them being ‘poor 
great powers’, lacking the capabilities to assume a managerial function in global politics. Or 
we could at least argue that rising powers are particularly careful about cost–benefit 
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calculations in global public goods provision and tend to privilege domestic developmental 
needs. For example, rising powers have focused on the protection of their economies in 
global trade negotiations and they have long tended to prioritise industrialisation over cli-
mate change mitigation efforts.2
However, while the costs of burden sharing seem to be an important factor in explaining 
rising powers’ high degree of reluctance towards contributing to public goods at the global 
level, things look different at the regional level. ‘Rising powers’ like India, Brazil or South 
Africa tend to be the dominant countries within their regions3 and we could certainly expect 
them to have the capabilities to influence their regional neighbourhood as well as a high 
degree of interest in its stability. It is at the regional level that the costs of providing public 
goods are likely to be consistent with these countries’ ability to provide them. We could 
therefore expect rising powers to contribute to the provision of regional public goods in a 
much more decisive and clear-cut manner as compared to the global level.
However, the empirical reality looks different: rising powers have sometimes been reluc-
tant to engage in their regions,4 including in the field of crisis management. This contribution 
builds upon a previous conceptualisation of ‘reluctance’ in world politics and develops it to 
flesh out its causal elements with the aim of theorising the drivers of reluctance. To explain 
varying reluctance, it focuses on a combination of international expectations and unclear 
domestic preferences. In the empirical analysis, the explanatory power of such a proto-theory 
of foreign policy reluctance is assessed with reference to four cases of regional crisis man-
agement by the democratic rising powers India and Brazil. The analysis focuses on periods 
in which these countries could be unequivocally considered as ‘rising’ and had stable gov-
ernments, that is, on phases during which reluctance is particularly puzzling. For the case 
of India, it addresses regional crisis management under the government of Narendra Modi 
of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (2014–2018), which, together with its coalition partners 
in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), has a stable majority in the lower house of 
Parliament (Lok Sabha); India at the same time has remained one of the few emerging powers 
with remarkably high growth rates. For Brazil, the focus is on regional crisis management 
during the years of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the Workers’ Party (PT) (2003–2011), 
a period of domestic political stability during which Brazil increasingly came to be recognised 
as a rising power and pursued an active foreign policy.5 The analysis confirms that reluctance 
emerges if there are obstacles to the formation of clear domestic preferences and interna-
tional expectations cannot be met.
Reluctance and the impact of (competing) expectations and unclear  
preferences
Reluctance is ubiquitous in world politics. Indecisiveness, delaying, muddling through, dis-
appointing the expectations of partners – these and similar attitudes are commonplace 
among international actors, but the phenomenon of reluctance has been largely ignored 
by the literature in the field of International Relations (IR). This is all the more surprising as 
the term is rather frequently used, not only with regard to rising powers, but also for example 
to the US.6 Only recently, a conceptualisation of reluctance was developed,7 but we still lack 
any kind of theorisation about what leads international actors to be reluctant. This contri-
bution aims to flesh out such causal dimensions of the concept of reluctance. As Goertz 
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points out in his seminal work, social science concepts always entail a causal dimension, and 
concept building is deeply interlinked with theorising.8
According to Destradi, reluctance can be understood as an analytical category that helps 
us grasp a ‘peculiar type or style of foreign policy that can be found across issue areas and 
settings’.9 Reluctance entails two constitutive dimensions, which are both necessary and 
jointly sufficient: hesitation and recalcitrance.10 Reluctance is a relational concept that always 
refers to an interaction between different actors. While the dimension of hesitation is focused 
on the ‘self’ – on an actor’s own internal dynamics – the second constitutive dimension of 
reluctance, recalcitrance, refers to an interplay with the ‘other(s)’.
Hesitation describes an ambivalent, indecisive attitude and is operationalised as entailing 
at least one of the following indicators: a lack of initiative, which is particularly relevant if we 
want to analyse how rising powers react to crises in their regional neighbourhood where 
they are the predominant actors; delaying, which amounts to not sticking to a previously 
set time frame or to ‘postponing important decisions in dealing with a specific issue or cri-
sis’;11 or flip-flopping, which involves frequent or sudden changes in policies or statements, 
or contradictions, for example among the statements of members of the same government.
The second constitutive dimension of reluctance, recalcitrance, captures an unwillingness 
or inability to conform with the expectations articulated by others, and thereby reflects the 
elements of obstructionism and resistance that resonate with the notion of reluctance. 
Recalcitrance can be operationalised as entailing at least one of the following indicators: 
ignoring requests made by others or expectations articulated by others, in our specific analysis 
with reference to crisis management; rejecting such requests, that is, explicitly denying one’s 
commitment; obstructing others’ initiatives without providing a consistent alternative given 
one’s parallel hesitation.12
Both dimensions, hesitation and recalcitrance, need to be in place in order to classify a 
policy as reluctant. Both of them can occur to different degrees, thereby entailing a contin-
uum and making reluctance, as well, a continuous concept.13 It has to be noted that, while 
reluctance in the political discourse is sometimes associated with a negative connotation, 
this contribution aims to use ‘reluctance’ as an analytical tool to grasp a particular type or 
style of foreign policy making that is not reflected in other existing concepts in IR. Importantly, 
reluctance does not simply amount to a passive foreign policy strategy. For example, a 
consistent refusal to get involved in a military dispute would not count as reluctant behaviour 
as it lacks the dimension of hesitation.14 Japan and Germany’s approach to the use of military 
force in the decades after World War II would similarly not count as reluctance according to 
this understanding since it was a clear and coherent policy course. Generally speaking, the 
opposite of reluctance would therefore be a determined and consistent (as opposed to 
hesitant) as well as responsive (as opposed to recalcitrant) foreign policy.15
Why does reluctance occur or, in other words, what leads governments to pursue reluctant 
policies? As suggested by Goertz, an explanation is inherent in the concept itself and, con-
versely, looking for such explanation helps us further develop the concept. In the case of 
reluctance, the two related but discrete constitutive dimensions of hesitation and recalci-
trance play a causal role in explaining the occurrence of reluctance. The dimension of hesi-
tation – with its indecisive, delaying, flip-flopping attitude – can be expected to contribute 
to the explanation of reluctance via domestic factors, which might prevent a government 
from following a determined and consistent course of action. The dimension of recalcitrance – 
that is, the fact of not conforming to others’ expectations – implies that such expectations 
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play a role in driving reluctance as well. In the field of international politics, we will focus on 
expectations by international actors. Importantly, as we will see, such domestic and inter-
national factors are deeply interrelated.
International expectations can be of different kinds. Particularly powerful states will be 
faced with an especially broad range of expectations given their potentially superior prob-
lem-solving ability, and particularly severe crises can be expected to generate more expec-
tations concerning their resolution. Rising powers will be faced with expectations articulated 
by established powers, for example when it comes to participating in global public goods 
provision. At the same time, they will face expectations by their immediate regional neigh-
bours, which might request them to commit to the solution of regional problems and the 
provision of regional public goods, but which might also feel threatened by their sheer power 
preponderance and wish that they avoid meddling with regional affairs.16 Competing expec-
tations by different international actors will be particularly challenging as compared to 
homogeneous expectations. As ultimately governments will always be the object of inter-
national expectations concerning their foreign policy, but as not all of them are always reluc-
tant, international expectations do not seem to be a sufficient condition for the occurrence 
of reluctance. In fact, if such expectations meet clear domestic preferences, the government 
might choose to ignore them and to pursue a consistent course of action (or, as we will see 
below, it might pursue a reluctant policy in order to appease competing expectations).
Foreign-policy preferences will crystallise as a result of a domestic process and are ana-
lytically and ‘[…] by definition causally independent of the strategies of other actors and, 
therefore, prior to specific interstate political interactions, including external threats, incen-
tives, manipulation of information, or other tactics’.17 By choosing one policy option and by 
pursuing a determined and consistent course of action, the government will not be hesitant. 
It might be recalcitrant, if it disappoints some (or all) international expectations, but this will 
not be a sufficient condition for reluctance.
While clear domestic preferences that dovetail or clash with homogeneous international 
expectations will therefore lead to non-reluctant policies, we now need to specify under 
what conditions reluctance, understood as a combination of recalcitrance and hesitation, 
will emerge.
At the domestic level, there are several factors that might lead to hesitation. Among them 
is, first, simple government weakness. Lacking a clear majority or being dependent on coa-
lition partners will make it more difficult to pursue consistent and determined courses of 
action. In this paper, the empirical analysis explicitly focuses on stable governments in order 
to control for this factor as far as possible.
Second, problems within the bureaucracy might have similar consequences.18 Despite a 
robust majority, a government might end up being hesitant because its bureaucracy lacks 
capacity or preparedness, leading to coordination problems with the centre or simply to an 
inability to take initiatives or to delays in policy making. Moreover, even a capable bureau-
cracy might be overwhelmed by too much information, an ‘increasing number of tasks’, ‘too 
many goals’ and ‘no agreement on the best means’,19 which will lead to the adoption of 
cognitive shortcuts to cope with complexity. It will be particularly likely in policy areas that 
are new to an emerging power or in severe crisis situations, since the bureaucratic and 
decision-making apparatus will likely lack the knowledge necessary to develop a clear policy 
position, while at the same time being forced to provide a quick response.
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Finally, hesitation might emerge (and possibly be reinforced by international expecta-
tions) as a consequence of domestic arguing over competing norms.20 We can identify indi-
cations of this explanation if we observe domestic actors using references to different 
normative foundations of foreign policy while they argue over the best course of action to 
follow. Such normative tensions are generally likely in rising powers as these countries try 
to adjust their policies to their changed (or changing) international status. Conformity with 
predominant international normative standards is likely to favour status gains, but might 
clash with established domestic norms, leading to sometimes contradictory, zig-zagging 
policies (hesitation). While this explanation of hesitation does not necessarily only apply to 
democracies, as such political struggles also take place within elites in authoritarian regimes, 
it nevertheless highlights that reluctant policies are often an outcome of a genuinely dem-
ocratic political process of negotiation and perhaps reflect the very essence of democracy. 
However, normative tensions might also emerge as a result of path dependency in the way 
a country’s bureaucracy conceives of foreign policy. For example, if a decades-old commit-
ment to certain norms on the part of the bureaucracy clashes with a new normative approach 
on the part of the executive, this might lead to hesitant policies.
Since reluctance by definition involves a relational aspect, hesitation (driven by the 
above-mentioned domestic factors) needs to be paired with recalcitrance in the interaction 
with international actors. In other words, in order to be reluctant, foreign policy will involve 
not conforming to some international expectations. At the international level, a government 
might be faced with either homogeneous or competing expectations, depending on whether 
all relevant actors expect it to adopt the same kind of policy or whether different actors 
expect different things from it. Such actors can be, for example, international partners, rel-
evant institutions or powerful competitors. If homogeneous expectations meet clear pref-
erences, this will lead to non-reluctant policies, as was mentioned above. By contrast, 
homogeneous expectations in combination with unclear domestic preferences will lead to 
reluctance since extremely hesitant, flip-flopping policies will almost automatically disap-
point international actors.21
If competing expectations by external actors meet unclear domestic preferences, we will 
obviously have a combination of recalcitrance and hesitation because the government will 
be torn apart between different expectations and will not have a clear own policy course.
To conclude, there is an additional explanation for reluctance, in which international 
expectations have a more explicit causal primacy. It refers to cases in which a government 
has a clear domestic preference, but is confronted with competing expectations. These might 
put it under such strong competing pressures that it will not be able to consistently imple-
ment its preferred policies; or it might consciously choose to pursue a hesitant policy (lack 
of initiative, delaying, flip-flopping) to conform to several of such different expectations. In 
other words, in the latter case, the government will try to appease, at least temporarily, as 
many actors as possible, but in that process, it will make contradictory decisions or adopt 
delaying tactics (hesitation). At the same time, as it will be impossible to appease everybody, 
recalcitrance about conforming to some of those expectations will inevitably emerge. The 
underlying assumption here is a rationalist one, and reluctance is used in a strategic manner. 
In fact, in some cases, reluctant policies help governments to keep international criticism 
and opposition at bay for a while by appeasing multiple competing expectations, or they 
allow them to buy time to collect additional information.
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The following case studies of India and Brazil’s regional crisis management will provide 
a first assessment of the plausibility of such explanations of reluctance focused on interna-
tional expectations and domestic preferences.
India under Modi: still a reluctant crisis manager in South Asia
After an unsuccessful interventionist phase in its neighbourhood in the 1980s, India has 
pursued a much more low-key approach to regional crisis management in the South Asian 
region since the 1990s. South Asia is an extremely difficult regional context: it is one of the 
least institutionalised regions in the world, with the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC) confined to political irrelevance due to the conflict between India and 
Pakistan. At the same time, the region is characterised by a huge asymmetry between India 
and the other regional countries (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal and 
Sri Lanka), which has led to hostility and suspicion towards New Delhi on the part of its 
smaller neighbours.22 Overall, India has not been able to contribute to regional cooperation 
in a meaningful way and has pursued reluctant policies in the management of several 
regional crises. Despite the introduction of his ‘neighbourhood first’ policy23 and initial pos-
itive signals such as the invitation of all South Asian heads of state and government to his 
inauguration as prime minister,24 Modi has not managed to reverse this trend.25 In the fol-
lowing, the analysis will focus on India’s reluctant approach to crisis management in 
Afghanistan and Nepal under Modi’s government.
Afghanistan is the most conflict-ridden country in South Asia and, since the conclusion 
of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission and the handover of the respon-
sibility for Afghanistan’s security to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in 2014, the 
situation on the ground has worsened; the Taliban have expanded their presence again, and 
new groups such as the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) have gained a foothold in the country.26 
Under the United Progressive Alliance governments of Manmohan Singh (2004–2009 and 
2009–2014), India became Afghanistan’s fifth-largest donor and was able to further expand 
the goodwill it enjoyed among the Afghan population through a mix of large-scale infra-
structure projects (e.g. the Delaram-Zaranj highway, the Salma Dam and the new Parliament 
building in Kabul), small development projects and a well-established scholarship pro-
gramme.27 By contrast, in the field of security, India’s policies were extremely reluctant as 
New Delhi pursued a hesitant (flip-flopping) and recalcitrant (rejecting and ignoring requests) 
approach on the provision of military equipment and cooperation requested by the Afghan 
government, including a failure to implement a 2011 Strategic Partnership Agreement in 
the subsequent years.28
Under Modi, not much has changed. India has a continued interest in the stabilisation of 
Afghanistan; it needs to avoid that the country becomes a base for terrorists able to carry 
out attacks against India, and it would like to see Afghanistan as a connectivity bridge to 
Central Asia.29 However, Modi has not managed to bring about a substantive shift towards 
a more determined and responsive Indian policy. India’s approach can still be classified as 
hesitant, as New Delhi did not take any initiatives to devise new ways to contribute to sta-
bilising Afghanistan. While, in an apparently significant policy shift, India in 2015–2016 for 
the first time donated lethal military equipment to Afghanistan (four Mi-25 attack helicopters 
in addition to three HAL Cheetah light utility helicopters),30 such support to the Afghan Air 
2228 S. DeSTRADI
Force came quite late, and in early 2018 all military helicopters delivered by India were 
reportedly grounded and needed repairs. According to Afghanistan’s Ambassador to India, 
‘at times requests have been delayed for too long’ to the disappointment of Kabul.31 In March 
2018, the Indian government agreed to buy four more refurbished Mi-24 helicopters for 
Afghanistan from Belarus,32 and India has agreed to further support the Afghan Air Force 
through a trilateral cooperation with Russia, from where most spare parts need to be pur-
chased.33 However, requests for the delivery of other lethal military equipment have been 
denied so far.
In the case of Afghanistan, India’s continued reluctance can be explained through the 
combination of competing international expectations and unclear domestic preferences. 
The Afghan government, with the exception of the initial months of Ashraf Ghani’s presi-
dency,34 has been calling for greater engagement on the part of India in matters of weapons 
deliveries and of security more generally. Such requests were increasingly backed by Western 
countries, especially the US and the UK, which have been ‘pushing India for a larger economic, 
but primarily military role’.35 In particular, US President Trump went ‘a step ahead [as com-
pared to previous administrations] by openly inviting India to have an active role in 
Afghanistan’.36 Such expectations however clash with those of Pakistan, which understands 
any kind of Indian engagement in Afghanistan as a vital threat to its own security.
Such competing international expectations have been met with unclear domestic pref-
erences over Afghanistan in India. In fact, New Delhi is interested, on the one hand, in keeping 
its own influence on Afghanistan. On the other hand, it wants to limit Pakistan’s influence 
over the country and therefore does not limit itself to an exclusively development-oriented 
approach. Instead, by signing a Strategic Partnership Agreement with Afghanistan, the Indian 
government has shown that it also aims to be engaged in matters of security. At the same 
time, the Indian government is aware that a more extensive security engagement would 
provoke its nuclear-armed rival Pakistan, which has long considered Afghanistan a hinterland 
that provides ‘strategic depth’ in the case of a war with India.37 Pakistan and its proxies have 
in the past reacted violently to India’s engagement in the country, as shown by repeated 
attacks on Indian personnel in Afghanistan. New Delhi’s continued reluctance in conflict 
management in Afghanistan can therefore be explained by a combination of the need to 
balance between diametrically opposite international expectations (by the Afghan and 
Western governments, on the one hand, and by Pakistan, on the other) and unclear domestic 
preferences in India, which have prevented New Delhi from drastically curtailing its engage-
ment. India’s reluctance is not ‘strategic’ in the sense of appeasing competing expectations, 
as discussed above. It is rather a consequence of an interplay between international expec-
tations and domestic arguing over competing norms. While there is a broad consensus 
among the Indian elite against any kind of ‘boots on the ground’ option,38 other forms of 
engagement are debated rather explicitly by ‘partisans’ and ‘conciliators’ in the Indian estab-
lishment.39 The Indian bureaucracy continues to stick to a ‘Nehruvian’ strategic culture 
focused on non-intervention, leading to a high degree of path dependency.40 But at the 
same time, the BJP government of Prime Minister Modi has sought to side-line Nehruvian 
discourses and has rather relied on Hindu-nationalist ideology, which calls for a more ‘mus-
cular’ approach to foreign policy. India’s declining recalcitrance on the issue of lethal weapons 
supplies under Modi could be a first indicator of the formation of a more explicitly interven-
tionist preference with regard to Afghanistan, which however still remains linked to the need 
to avoid outright war with Pakistan.
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In the case of Nepal, the analysis focuses on a serious domestic political crisis related to 
the adoption of a new constitution. After the devastating earthquake of April 2015, Nepal’s 
main political parties decided to speed up the constitutional process to replace the 2007 
interim constitution, which had been adopted after the end of Nepal’s civil war and the 
country’s transition to democracy. The new constitution was passed on 20 September 2015, 
amid huge protests by disadvantaged groups dissatisfied with several of its provisions, which 
were considered to perpetuate the dominance of traditional upper caste hill elites.41 Among 
the protesting groups were the Madhesis and Tharus of southern Nepal’s Terai, a region that 
borders India and whose inhabitants have huge affinities toward their Indian neighbours. 
The protests went on for months, with over 50 casualties, mostly due to police firing into 
crowds. In that context, the otherwise open border between Nepal and India was closed for 
135 days by Madhesi protesters, and the interruption of supplies originating from the block-
ade led to a humanitarian crisis.42
India’s approach to crisis management in Nepal is almost a textbook case of reluctance 
understood as hesitation and recalcitrance. As Jha puts it, India’s policy was characterised 
by ‘inconsistency, ad-hoc policy making, multiplicity of power centres, conflicting messages, 
and absence of will’.43 Moreover, India was recalcitrant all over again when it came to requests 
articulated by different political actors in Nepal, which were repeatedly disappointed. India 
has a long history of political meddling in Nepal and over the past decades has repeatedly 
struggled to keep its influence on that country, which in turn has sought to attenuate its 
dependence on India by seeking closer ties with China.44 During the constitutional crisis, 
the Indian government followed an extremely contradictory policy. Initially, New Delhi sup-
ported the Madhesis’ concerns and India’s Foreign Secretary Jaishankar was sent to 
Kathmandu to put pressure on Nepal’s government to delay the adoption of the new con-
stitution and to make it more inclusive.45 Later, India tacitly supported the blockade,46 leading 
to disappointment and to a rapprochement with China on the part of the K. P. Oli government 
in Kathmandu. But the fear of losing its influence on Nepal to China ultimately led New Delhi 
to ‘prod[…] the Madhesis to withdraw the blockade’.47 In a new twist to its Nepal policy, in 
July 2016, India persuaded the Maoist leader Prachanda to withdraw from the governing 
coalition in Kathmandu, thereby side-lining the excessively China-friendly Prime Minister 
Oli, while it later ‘pushed the Madhesi parties to participate in elections – even though they 
were deeply uncomfortable with the constitution, almost making a two year policy exercise 
futile’.48 Ultimately, New Delhi’s contradictory approach to Nepal under Prime Minister Modi 
led to a massive deterioration of bilateral relations and after the victory of the Left Alliance 
in Nepal’s parliamentary elections in late 2017, India–Nepal relations reached a histori-
cal low.49
How can we explain India’s highly reluctant policies in dealing with the crisis in Nepal? 
As opposed to the case of Afghanistan, domestic politics in Nepal were not a concern to the 
international community during the period analysed, so the only international expectations 
the Indian government was confronted with were those of different political actors in Nepal. 
But those expectations were highly divergent and, given the looming threat of growing 
Chinese influence in Nepal, they were taken seriously by the Indian government. Given India’s 
long history of political influence on Nepal, any Indian move is an object of heated debate 
in Nepal, and India is the first international actor Nepalese parties and civil society seek help 
from, blame or just refer to, depending on the situation.50 The political elites in Kathmandu 
therefore had expectations vis-à-vis India during the crisis (most notably, that it end its 
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support for the Madhesi cause), the Nepalese government put pressure on India by ‘playing 
the China card’, and the marginalised groups in the Terai made use of their close relationship 
to the Indian population across the border to get New Delhi’s support. Such competing 
expectations met unclear domestic preferences in India concerning the course to follow in 
Nepal. Some of them were related to a lack of bureaucratic capacity, which contributed to 
coordination problems in the way different sections of the Indian elite dealt with Nepal. 
Generally speaking, India’s foreign policy capacity is limited by huge institutional deficiencies, 
including a tiny diplomatic corps51 and individualistic decision making on the part of pow-
erful foreign service officers.52 Due to such capacity constraints and the ensuing lack of 
strategic planning, in cases like relations with Nepal, a range of actors who have direct ties 
to local elites tend to take over India’s foreign policy.
Relatedly, in the case of Nepal there were underlying normative tensions among different 
constituencies in India. The Indian political landscape has long been fragmented in its 
approach to different sections of Nepal’s society, from the hill elites to the army to the 
Maoists.53 Within India, one particularly powerful constituency was the Hindu nationalist 
camp around the governing BJP, which had an interest in supporting Nepal’s old elites (and 
even in reviving the Nepalese Hindu monarchy) to the detriment of the inclusion of minori-
ties, especially the Madhesis.54 However, as in the case of Afghanistan, the path-dependent 
Nehruvian notion of non-interference might have played a role in preventing India from 
openly intervening in a consistent manner. At the same time, the dramatically growing 
Chinese influence on Nepal and the need for India to counter it to keep its traditional sphere 
of influence (and against the backdrop of its declared ‘neighbourhood first’ policy) contrib-
uted to the difficulties in reaching a clear set of preferences vis-à-vis competing expectations 
from Nepal. As a result, the Modi government, despite its stability, ultimately pursued a 
reluctant approach.55
Brazil under Lula: determination and responsiveness in regional crisis 
management
Under President ‘Lula’ da Silva (2003–2011), Brazil became an increasingly active international 
player, with a clear intention to gain international recognition for its status as an emerging 
great power and a recognisable aspiration to regional leadership. Other than India, Brazil 
was not reluctant when it came to the management of conflicts and crises in its region. This 
analysis focuses particularly on Brazil’s role in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in 
Haiti (MINUSTAH) from 2004, and on its engagement in the Colombian civil war between 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC) and the Colombian 
government during the years of the Lula presidency. Besides a range of domestic political 
crises in several South American countries, these were the two most severe crises in Brazil’s 
extended neighbourhood during that period.
In the case of MINUSTAH, Brazil shed its initial reluctance, took over the leadership of this 
UN peacekeeping mission and pursued it without much hesitation or recalcitrance. A range 
of other South American countries participated in the mission under Brazilian leadership.56 
For the Brazilian government, crisis management in Haiti was a welcome opportunity to 
show its commitment to the United Nations – and government representatives explicitly 
depicted leadership in MINUSTAH as a way to gain international acceptance for Brazil’s claim 
for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.57 At the same time, taking over the 
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leadership of a UN peacekeeping mission was a remarkable development in Brazil’s foreign 
and security policy, which had long been informed by a commitment to non-intervention.58 
In the case of MINUSTAH, the Brazilian government ultimately managed to pursue a pre-
dominantly consistent, non-reluctant policy course mainly because it could put forward a 
clear preference by allaying domestic fears and criticism in a process of arguing over the 
norms driving the mission, while at the same time aligning international expectations by 
global and regional actors.
At first, however, some elements of hesitation, and particularly some inconsistencies in 
Brazil’s policies, could be observed in its approach to the crisis in Haiti. In fact, Brazil initially 
refused to participate in a Multinational Interim Force established with UNSC Resolution 
1529 (on which it had voted in favour) citing this resolution’s reference to Chapter VII, which 
allows for the use of force without the consent of the parties involved. Brazil’s argument was 
that it could not participate in a mission to ‘impose peace’, among other things due to the 
provisions in Article 4 of its Constitution.59 However, two months later Brazil agreed to par-
ticipate in the multinational force under Resolution 1542, even though this resolution was 
equally based on Chapter VII.
The Brazilian government had initially been subjected to different international expec-
tations. The US was not interested in further meddling with the situation in Haiti and its 
representatives were reportedly aware that a US presence in Haiti would be met with resis-
tance.60 France, the former colonial power, had similar concerns, and President Chirac called 
President Lula on the phone in March 2004 to ask for Brazil taking over the command of the 
UN mission – a wish that had the backing of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.61 While glob-
al-level actors therefore wanted Brazil to intervene, regional countries were very sceptical 
of such a mission (see, for example, criticism by countries like Chile and Argentina).62 
Domestically, the formation of a clear preference was initially hampered by a debate on the 
mission to Haiti, which was criticised (among others by intellectuals, MPs, representatives 
of unions and social movements, as well as by some members of Lula’s PT) as an occupation 
force violating Haiti’s sovereignty and reinforcing US hegemony.63
Ultimately, however, the Brazilian government managed to achieve a clear preference. A 
domestic coalition of diplomats and the military, which had an interest in Brazil’s leadership 
of MINUSTAH as a tool to get international recognition and to ‘maximize institutional gains’,64 
respectively, managed to get support among the public and the parliament. Brazil therefore 
could pursue a determined, non-reluctant policy. The Brazilian government justified its bend-
ing to international pressure and its agreement to lead the multinational force under 
Resolution 1542 by arguing that in this Resolution, Chapter VII was mentioned only in one 
section and not in the introduction, and therefore it did not refer to the entire resolution.65 
Through this reinterpretation, the Brazilian government managed to frame MINUSTAH as a 
peacekeeping operation and to ‘claim that [Brazil] was mostly concerned with humanitarian 
tasks and Haiti’s development’.66 This ‘rhetorical exercise’67 was an important move for rec-
onciling contrasting international expectations and giving a direction to the domestic nor-
mative debate about Brazil’s foreign engagement.68
The most virulent ‘traditional’ armed conflict in South America over the past decades has 
been the civil war in Colombia. Also in this case, the Brazilian government under Lula pursued 
a fairly consistent, not hesitant and thereby non-reluctant, approach to crisis management 
– albeit in a very different form, privileging low-key offers of mediation and support. 
Throughout the period analysed and even beyond, Brazil consistently defined the conflict 
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as a domestic matter of Colombia, thereby refusing external interventions, and expressed 
support for a negotiated solution, in line with its own constitutionally-sanctioned foreign 
policy norms.69 In that context, Brazil repeatedly offered to serve as a mediator and tried to 
portray itself as a neutral actor by condemning the FARC’s crimes, but at the same time not 
declaring the FARC a terrorist organisation, which would have limited the room for negoti-
ations.70 Moreover, Brazil repeatedly provided logistical support in the liberation of hos-
tages.71 Overall, Brazil’s interest in the conflict in Colombia was mostly related to the limitation 
of potential spill-over effects along the common border, given repeated cases of incursions 
by members of FARC into Brazilian territory and their connections to sections of the Brazilian 
drug mafia.72
Some elements of moderate recalcitrance were in place in Brazil’s policy since Brazil was 
not ready to follow the Colombian government’s call for labelling the FARC a terrorist organ-
isation.73 Brazil was also critical of US meddling with Colombia’s affairs and of the militarisa-
tion related to Plan Colombia, and it wanted to avoid a further internationalisation of the 
conflict. However, under the Lula government, Brazil’s approach to the Colombian civil war 
displayed no indicators of hesitation (lack of initiative, delaying or flip-flopping). Overall, 
therefore, Lula’s Brazil followed a non-reluctant approach based on consistent but low-key 
offers of support. It could arguably do so because it developed a clear preference on the 
modalities of conflict resolution and, at the same time, it was not subject to competing 
international expectations. The Colombian government called for a labelling of the FARC as 
a terrorist organisation, but did not articulate other expectations concerning a more active 
Brazilian involvement in the conflict. This was mainly due to the ideological differences 
between Lula and Colombian President Uribe (2002–2010), which contributed to make the 
two countries ‘distant neighbours’.74 Only gradually did bilateral relations improve, as from 
2009 Uribe got less support for his hard-line approach to the conflict from the US under the 
Obama administration, and therefore had to rely more on regional partners such as Brazil.75 
An indication of such improving relations was Uribe’s decision to join the UNASUR Defence 
Council, which had been founded in 2009 at Brazil’s initiative as a reaction to Colombian 
strikes against FARC camps on ecuadorian territory.76 This rapprochement, which continued 
under Colombia’s president Santos, did not lead to specific calls for greater Brazilian engage-
ment. Similarly, neither the US nor other international actors put pressure on the Brazilian 
government concerning crisis management in Colombia. In Brazil’s domestic debate, con-
servative actors accused the Lula government of being too sympathetic to the FARC,77 but 
generally there was a rather broad consensus among Brazil’s political forces about pursuing 
a low-key approach to the Colombian conflict without getting enmeshed militarily.78 All 
these factors ultimately allowed Brazil to pursue a non-reluctant approach to crisis 
management.
Conclusion
This contribution aimed to address the sometimes puzzling phenomenon of powerful coun-
tries that pursue hesitant, muddling-through, indecisive – ‘reluctant’ – courses of action 
when it comes to the management of crises in their neighbourhood that have the potential 
to adversely affect their interests and potentially even to destabilise them. To this end, the 
paper built upon a conceptualisation of reluctance based on the two necessary and jointly 
sufficient conditions of hesitation and recalcitrance, and it proposed an explanation for 
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reluctance based on international expectations and domestic factors. In a first effort at the-
orising reluctance, it was hypothesised that governments will tend to adopt reluctant policies 
if they face expectations by international actors and, at the same time, do not have clear 
domestic preferences due to factors like government weakness, lack of bureaucratic capacity 
or domestic arguing over foreign policy norms. In the case of competing international expec-
tations, they might also use a flip-flopping approach to temporarily appease different expec-
tations. The empirical analysis focused on India and Brazil as ‘rising powers’ during phases 
of domestic political stability, and particularly on instances of regional crisis management 
by these two countries. It revealed that diametrically opposite expectations by international 
and regional actors concerning India’s security engagement in Afghanistan, in combination 
with domestic normative debates and corresponding difficulties in devising clear prefer-
ences, have led to New Delhi’s highly reluctant policy. In the case of Nepal’s constitutional 
crisis, reluctance has been the outcome of competing expectations by different Nepalese 
actors, paired with lack of bureaucratic capacity (coordination problems) and normative 
disagreements in India. By contrast, Lula’s Brazil was able to pursue a proactive and consistent 
policy towards Haiti by framing the mission in a way that allayed domestic concerns and 
aligned different international expectations. Brazil’s approach to the conflict in Colombia 
reveals that a low-key engagement, if consistently pursued, does not amount to reluctance. 
In this case, Brazil had a clear preference for mediation and other forms of limited support, 
and it was not faced with competing international pressures.
Based on these initial findings on varying reluctance in India’s and Brazil’s regional crisis 
management efforts, further research will need to refine the proto-theory of reluctance 
developed in this contribution and to address a broader range of cases across different world 
regions. An analysis of longer-term trends is also a promising area of future research. In fact, 
reluctance might be deeply intertwined with rising powers’ very process of ‘rise’, with its 
peculiar combination of increased international expectations (and sensitivity to them for 
status reasons) and domestic debates or insecurities about the new tasks related to growing 
power capabilities and international recognition. Further research will therefore need to 
study how reluctance varies over time and to what extent it might hamper rising powers’ 
regional and global ambitions.
At the same time, reluctance is certainly not confined to rising powers or to the regional 
level of analysis. Powerful international actors, including established powers, often pursue 
hesitant and recalcitrant policies when it comes to global public goods provision. A better 
understanding of what drives reluctance in those cases could make a major contribution to 
addressing some of the most pressing problems of our time.
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Notes
 1. On the notion that with power comes responsibility, see Zoellick, “Speech.” The term ‘rising 
powers’ should be used carefully against the backdrop of massive domestic crises in countries 
like Brazil and South Africa. It will nevertheless be employed in this study as the focus of the 
empirical analysis is on periods that were generally considered to be phases of international 
ascendancy for rising powers.
 2. Hochstetler and Milkoreit, “Responsibilities in Transition”; Narlikar, “Peculiar Chauvinism or 
Strategic Calculation?” On rising powers’ likely impact on global governance, see Kahler, “Rising 
Powers and Global Governance.”
 3. On these countries as ‘regional powers’, see for example Nolte, “How to Compare Regional 
Powers.”
 4. For example, on Brazil’s unwillingness to fully engage in South American regionalism, see 
Merke, “Neither Balance nor Bandwagon”; Burges, “Revisiting Consensual Hegemony.” South 
Africa’s engagement in southern Africa has similarly been described as ‘full of ambiguities and 
contradictions’; Alden and Le Pere, “South Africa in Africa,” 145.
 5. Soares de Lima and Hirst, “Brazil as an Intermediate State”; Christensen, “Brazil’s Foreign Policy 
Priorities.”
 6. Haass, The Reluctant Sheriff; Fehl, Living with a Reluctant Hegemon.
 7. Destradi, “Reluctance in International Politics.”
 8. Goertz, Social Science Concepts, 5.
 9. Destradi, “Reluctance in International Politics,” 323.
 10. Ibid., 325–8.
 11. Ibid., 327.
 12. Ibid., 328. Correspondingly, the indicators of hesitation refer to an actor’s own policies, inde-
pendent of interactions with others, while the indicators of recalcitrance always relate to an 
interaction with other actors. Indicators like ‘delaying’ and ‘obstructionism’ are therefore analyt-
ically distinct: delaying primarily refers to previously set own goals and timeframes, while ob-
structionism (whether it involves a temporal dimension or not) is explicitly aimed at initiatives 
promoted by others.
 13. Ibid., 328.
 14. Ibid., 325.
 15. According to Destradi, reluctance does not have a single negative pole, but two negative 
poles: determination and responsiveness; Ibid., 324.
 16. On the contestation of regional powers’ policies, see ebert et al., “Contestation in Asia.”
 17. Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously,” 519. This is, of course, a simplification needed for 
analytical reasons.
 18. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this aspect to me.
 19. Rathbun, “Uncertain About Uncertainty,” 546.
 20. Risse, “International Norms.”
THIRD WORLD QUARTeRLy 2235
 21. Competing expectations will by definition lead to recalcitrance, as not all of them can be 
 addressed at the same time. But without the dimension of hesitation, this does not amount to 
reluctance.
 22. Destradi, India’s Foreign and Security Policy in South Asia, 56–61.
 23. Passi and Bhatnagar, “India, India’s Neighbourhood and Modi.”
 24. Swami, “Modi Invites Saarc Leaders.”
 25. On the more general issue of continuity and change under Modi, see Chatterjee Miller and 
Sullivan de estrada, “India’s Rise at 70”; Hall, “Is a ‘Modi Doctrine’ emerging”; Hall, “Multialignment 
and Indian Foreign Policy.”
 26. International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan: Growing Challenges.”
 27. Sinha, “Rising Powers and Peacebuilding,” 137–45.
 28. Destradi, “India: A Reluctant Partner for Afghanistan.”
 29. Mahalingam, “India’s Afghanistan Policy,” 105.
 30. Gady, “India’s Plans to Buy Helicopter Gunships.”
 31. Haidar and Peri, “Afghan Army Chief Coming to India.”
 32. Laskar, “India Will Provide 4 Mi-24 Choppers.”
 33. Wagner, “India’s Bilateral Security Relationship,” 18.
 34. Das, “Afghanistan’s Relations with India and Iran.”
 35. Taneja, “India and the Afghan Taliban.”
 36. Ranade, “Trump’s Afghanistan Strategy,” 3.
 37. Destradi, “India: A Reluctant Partner for Afghanistan,” 106.
 38. Ibid., 109.
 39. Paliwal, My Enemy’s Enemy, 206–10. The notion of ‘uncertainty’ in decision making does not 
seem to have much explanatory power as during the period analysed the situation in 
Afghanistan did not present entirely new challenges that might have caught the Indian 
 bureaucracy or government off guard.
 40. Hall, “The Persistence of Nehruvianism.” Among the many works on strategic culture in India, 
see Tanham, “Indian Strategic Culture”; Bajpai, “Indian Strategic Culture.”
 41. Jha, “Nepal’s Constitutional Politics.”
 42. International Crisis Group, “Nepal’s Divisive New Constitution.”
 43. Jha, “How India Steadily Lost.”
 44. Destradi, India’s Foreign and Security Policy in South Asia, 96–128.
 45. Majumder, “Why India Is Concerned.”
 46. Jha, “India Must Firmly Push for Madhesi Inclusion.”
 47. Jha, “How India Steadily Lost.”
 48. Ibid.
 49. Kaura, “Grading India’s Neighborhood Diplomacy.”
 50. For details on India’s involvement over the years, see Jha, “A Nepali Perspective.”
 51. Markey, “Developing India’s Foreign Policy Software.”
 52. Chatterjee Miller, “India’s Feeble Foreign Policy,” 14–16.
 53. For example, in 2005, towards the end of Nepal’s civil war, the Indian government supported 
the Royal Nepalese Army through training in its fight against the Maoist rebels, while the 
Ministry of external Affairs gradually came to embrace the notion of including the Maoists in 
the political process, and Indian politicians ultimately mediated a peace agreement between 
the representatives of Nepal’s democratic parties and the Maoists with the support of the 
Indian government; Destradi, India’s Foreign and Security Policy in South Asia, 112–13.
 54. Muni, “With the Left Alliance.”
 55. As for Afghanistan, the notion of ‘uncertainty’ in decision making does not necessarily apply to 
the case of Nepal since India has a long experience in dealing with the troubled politics of that 
country and was not confronted by an entirely new type of crisis that could be interpreted as 
challenging the cognitive ability of policy makers.
 56. Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay contributed troops. Colombia 
was among the contributors of civilian/police personnel.
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 57. Gauthier and John de Sousa, “Brazil in Haiti,” 1. This connection was, however, denied by Brazil’s 
Foreign Minister Amorim; Ministério das Relações exteriores, “entrevista Do Ministro Celso 
Amorim, 24/3/2008.”
 58. Christensen, “Brazil’s Foreign Policy Priorities,” 277.
 59. Gauthier and John de Sousa, “Brazil in Haiti,” 1.
 60. Fernández Moreno et al., “Trapped between Many Worlds,” 383.
 61. Andrade, “Brasil Tem Tropa De 1.100 Militares.”
 62. Hirst, “La Intervención Sudamericana en Haiti.”
 63. cmi brasil, “Manifesto Da Campanha.”
 64. Harig and Kenkel, “Are Rising Powers Consistent or Ambiguous Foreign Policy Actors?” 636.
 65. Ibid., 2.
 66. Harig and Kenkel, “Are Rising Powers Consistent or Ambiguous Foreign Policy Actors?” 635.
 67. Ibid.
 68. Christensen, “Brazil’s Foreign Policy Priorities,” 277.
 69. Ministério das Relações exteriores, “Para Pinheiro Guimarães, Al Precisa De Um Plano Marshall.”
 70. Ministério das Relações exteriores, “Íntegra Da entrevista De Celso Amorim, 5/5/2008.”
 71. Candeas, “Brasil y Colombia,” 299.
 72. Latinnews, “Tracking Trends.”
 73. Tarapués Sandino, “Colombia y Brasil,” 432.
 74. Flemes, “Brasil-Colombia”; Soares de Lima and Hirst, “Brazil as an Intermediate State,” 35.
 75. Latinnews, “Colombia Reassesses Its Foreign Policy Priorities.”
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 77. Latinnews, “Uribe’s Diplomatic Influence Waxes.”
 78. Istituto de estudos Socioeconômicos, “Tabelas.”
Bibliography
Alden, Chris, and Garth Le Pere. “South Africa in Africa: Bound to Lead?” Politikon 36, no. 1 (2009): 
145–169. doi:10.1080/02589340903155443.
Andrade, Renato. 2004. “Brasil Tem Tropa De 1.100 Militares Para Ir Ao Haiti.” gazeta digital, March 5. 
http://www.gazetadigital.com.br/conteudo/show/secao/10/materia/30135.
Bajpai, Kanti. “Indian Strategic Culture.” In South Asia in 2020, edited by Michael R. Chambers, 245–304. 
Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002.
Burges, Sean W. “Revisiting Consensual Hegemony: Brazilian Regional Leadership in Question.” 
International Politics 52, no. 2 (2015): 193–207. doi:10.1057/ip.2014.43.
Candeas, Alessandro. “Brasil y Colombia: vecinos otrora distantes descubren el potencial de su rel-
ación.” In Colombia y Brasil: ¿Socios estratégicos en la construcción de Suramérica?, edited by eduardo 
Pastrana Buelvas, Stefan Jost, and Daniel Flemes, 283–308. Bogotá: editorial Pontificia Universidad 
Javeriana, 2012.
Chatterjee Miller, Manjari, and Kate Sullivan de estrada, eds. “Special Issue: ‘India’s Rise at 70’.” 
International Affairs 93, no. 1 (2017): 1–198. doi:10.1093/ia/iiw036.
Chatterjee Miller, Manjari. “India’s Feeble Foreign Policy.” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 3 (2013): 14–19.
Christensen, Steen Fryba. “Brazil’s Foreign Policy Priorities.” Third World Quarterly 34, no. 2 (2013): 
271–86. doi:10.1080/01436597.2013.775785.
cmi brasil. 2004. “Manifesto Da Campanha: Não ao envio de tropas do Brasil ao Haiti.” April 8. https://
midiaindependente.org/pt/red/2004/04/277171.shtml.
Das, Nihar Ranjan. “Afghanistan’s Relations with India and Iran: An Assessment of the Ghani Period.” 
Indian Council of World Affairs Issue Brief, July 27, 2016.
Destradi, Sandra. “India: A Reluctant Partner for Afghanistan.” The Washington Quarterly 37, no. 2 
(2014): 103–117. doi:10.1080/0163660X.2014.926212.
Destradi, Sandra. “Reluctance in International Politics: A Conceptualization.” European Journal of 
International Relations 23, no. 2 (2017): 315–40.
THIRD WORLD QUARTeRLy 2237
Destradi, Sandra. India’s Foreign and Security Policy in South Asia: Regional Power Strategies. London 
and New york: Routledge, 2012.
ebert, Hannes, Daniel Flemes, and Georg Strüver. “The Politics of Contestation in Asia: How Japan and 
Pakistan Deal with Their Rising Neighbors.” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 7, no. 2 
(2014): 221–260.
Fehl, Caroline. Living with a Reluctant Hegemon: Explaining European Responses to US Unilateralism. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Fernández Moreno, Marta, Carlos Chagas Vianna Braga, and Maíra Siman Gomes. “Trapped between 
Many Worlds: A Post-Colonial Perspective on the Un Mission in Haiti (Minustah).” International 
Peacekeeping 19, no. 3 (2012): 377–392. doi:10.1080/13533312.2012.696389.
Flemes, Daniel. “Brasil-Colombia: ¿De vecinos distantes a socios estratégicos?” Iberoamericana XV, no. 
60 (2015): 171–174.
Gady, Franz-Stefan. 2018. “India’s Plans to Buy Helicopter Gunships for Afghanistan.” The Diplomat, 
January 2. https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/indias-plans-to-buy-helicopter-gunships-for-af-
ghanistan/
Gauthier, Amélie, and Sarah John de Sousa. “Brazil in Haiti: Debate over the Peacekeeping Mission.” 
FRIDe Comment, November 2006.
Goertz, Gary. Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006.
Haass, Richard N. The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States after the Cold War. New york: Council on 
Foreign Relations Press, 1997.
Haidar, Suhasini, and Dinakar Peri. 2016. “Afghan Army Chief Coming to India with Revised Wish List.” 
The Hindu, July 25. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Afghan-Army-chief-coming-to-
India-with-revised-wish-list/article14507929.ece
Hall, Ian. “Is a ‘Modi Doctrine’ emerging in Indian Foreign Policy?” Australian Journal of International 
Affairs 69, no. 3 (2015): 247–252. doi:10.1080/10357718.2014.1000263.
Hall, Ian. “Multialignment and Indian Foreign Policy under Narendra Modi.” The Round Table 105, no. 3 
(2016): 271–286. doi:10.1080/00358533.2016.1180760.
Hall, Ian. “The Persistence of Nehruvianism in India’s Strategic Culture.” In Strategic Asia 2016-17, edited 
by Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills, 141–167. Seattle: National Bureau of Asian 
Research, 2016.
Harig, Christoph, and Kai Michael Kenkel. “Are Rising Powers Consistent or Ambiguous Foreign Policy 
Actors? Brazil, Humanitarian Intervention and the ‘Graduation Dilemma’.” International Affairs 93, 
no. 3 (2017): 625–641. doi:10.1093/ia/iix051.
Hirst, Mônica. “La intervención Sudamericana en Haiti.” FRIDe Comentario, April 2007.
Hochstetler, Kathryn, and Manjana Milkoreit. “Responsibilities in Transition: emerging Powers in the 
Climate Change Negotiations.” Global Governance 21, no. 2 (2015): 205–226.
International Crisis Group. “Afghanistan: Growing Challenges.” Commentary/Asia, April 30, 2017. 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/afghanistan-growing-challenges.
International Crisis Group. “Nepal’s Divisive New Constitution: An existential Crisis.” Report no. 276/
Asia, April 4, 2016. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/nepal/nepal%e2%80%99s- 
divisive-new-constitution-existential-crisis.
Istituto de estudos Socioeconômicos. “Tabelas.” In Plano Colômbia: Perspectivas do Parlamento 
Brasileiro, 65–76. Brasília: INeSC, 2002.
Jha, Prashant. “A Nepali Perspective on International Involvement in Nepal.” In Nepal in Transition: 
From People’s War to Fragile Peace, edited by Sebastian von einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Suman 
Pradhan, 332–358. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Jha, Prashant. 2015. “Nepal’s Constitutional Politics: It’s Time to Drop the Arrogance.” Hindustan Times, 
August 25. https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/nepal-s-constitutional-politics-it-s-time-to-
drop-the-arrogance/story-uAyhyTOeAcVvqQ2ftHDqCN.html
Jha, Prashant. 2017. “How India Steadily Lost All Its Leverage in Nepal.” Hindustan Times, December 23. 
https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/how-india-steadily-lost-all-its-leverage-in-nepal/
story-eyZcX3OOVJRVqJvP7eXH0O.html
2238 S. DeSTRADI
Jha, Prashant. 2017. “India Must Firmly Push for Madhesi Inclusion with the Nepali President.” 
Hindustan Times, April 18. https://www.hindustantimes.com/authors/india-must-firmly-push-for- 
madhesi-inclusion-with-the-nepali-president/story-WHz8glB8xIJSepSqf3CcnI.html
Kahler, Miles. “Rising Powers and Global Governance: Negotiating Change in a Resilient Status Quo.” 
International Affairs 89, no. 3 (2013): 711–729. doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12041.
Kaura, Vinay. 2018. “Grading India’s Neighborhood Diplomacy.” The Diplomat, January 1. https://the-
diplomat.com/2017/12/grading-indias-neighborhood-diplomacy/
Laskar, Rezaul H. 2018. “India Will Provide 4 Mi-24 Choppers to Kabul, Says Afghan envoy.” Hindustan 
Times, March 27. https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/india-will-provide-4-mi-24- 
choppers-to-kabul-says-afghan-envoy/story-HGvDXi8b6D0fTT8unBwPMO.html
Latinnews. “Colombia Reassesses Its Foreign Policy Priorities.” Latin American Regional Report, Andean 
Group, March 2009.
Latinnews. “Tracking Trends.” Latin American Weekly Report, WR-10-21, 2010.
Latinnews. “Uribe’s Diplomatic Influence Waxes.” Latin American Regional Report, Andean Group, 
August 2008.
Mahalingam, V. “India’s Afghanistan Policy.” CLAWS Journal 15 (2016): 91–111.
Majumder, Sanjoy. 2015. “Why India Is Concerned About Nepal’s Constitution.” BBC News, September 
22. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-34313280
Markey, Daniel. “Developing India’s Foreign Policy Software.” Asia Policy 8 (2009): 73–96. doi:10.1353/
asp.2009.0025.
Merke, Federico. “Neither Balance nor Bandwagon: South American International Society Meets 
Brazil’s Rising Power.” International Politics 52, no. 2 (2015): 178–192. doi:10.1057/ip.2014.49.
Ministério das Relações exteriores. 2008. “entrevista do Ministro Celso Amorim ao programa Roda 
Viva, 24/3/2008.” http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/politica-externa/diplomacia-economi-
ca-comercial-e-financeira/163-discursos-artigos-e-entrevistas/7961-entrevista-concedida- 
pelo-ministro-das-relacoes-exteriores-embaixador-celso-amorim-ao-programa-roda- 
viva-sao-paulo-sp-24-03-2008.
Ministério das Relações exteriores. 2008. “Íntegra da entrevista de Celso Amorim (entrevista do 
Ministro Celso Amorim ao repórter Luiz Carlos Azenha, 5/5/2008).” http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/
pt-BR/discursos-artigos-e-entrevistas-categoria/ministro-das-relacoes-exteriores-entrevis-
tas/7969-entrevista-concedida-pelo-ministro-das-relacoes-exteriores-embaixador-celso- 
amorim-ao-reporter-luiz-carlos-azenha-brasilia-df-05-05-2008.
Ministério das Relações exteriores. 2008. “Para Pinheiro Guimarães, AL precisa de um Plano Marshall 
(entrevista Secretário-Geral, embaixador Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, ao jornal Valor econômico, 
14/07/2008)”. http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/discursos-artigos-e-entrevistas-categoria/secretario- 
geral-das-relacoes-exteriores-entrevistas/5924-para-pinheiro-guimaraes-al-precisa-de-um- 
plano-marshall-entrevista-secretario-geral-embaixador-samuel-pinheiro-guimaraes-ao- 
jornal-valor-economico-14-07-2008.
Moravcsik, Andrew. “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics.” 
International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997): 513–553. doi:10.1162/002081897550447.
Muni, S. D. 2017. “With the Left Alliance Now Dominant in Nepal, India Must Reach out with Positive 
Agenda.” The Wire, December 16. https://thewire.in/external-affairs/nepal-left-alliance-uml
Narlikar, Amrita. “Peculiar Chauvinism or Strategic Calculation? explaining the Negotiating Strategy of 
a Rising India.” International Affairs 82, no. 1 (2006): 59–76. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2006.00515.x.
Nolte, Detlef. “How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics.” Review of 
International Studies 36, no. 4 (2010): 889–993.
Paliwal, Avinash. My Enemy’s Enemy: India in Afghanistan from the Soviet Invasion to the US Withdrawal. 
Noida: HarperCollins, 2017.
Passi, Ritika, and Aryman Bhatnagar. “India, India’s Neighbourhood and Modi: Setting the Stage.” In 
Neighbourhood First: Navigating Ties under Modi, edited by Aryman Bhatnagar and Ritika Passi, 
 3–12. New Delhi: ORF, 2016.
Ranade, Akshay. Trump’s Afghanistan Strategy and emerging Alignments in the Region: Implications 
for India. ORF Issue Brief, November 2017.
THIRD WORLD QUARTeRLy 2239
Rathbun, Brian C. “Uncertain About Uncertainty: Understanding the Multiple Meanings of a Crucial 
Concept in International Relations Theory.” International Studies Quarterly 51, no. 3 (2007): 533–557. 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2007.00463.x.
Risse, Thomas. “International Norms and Domestic Change: Arguing and Communicative Behavior in 
the Human Rights Area.” Politics & Society 27, no. 4 (1999): 529–559. doi:10.1177/00323292990270
04004.
Sinha, Shakti. “Rising Powers and Peacebuilding: India’s Role in Afghanistan.” In Rising Powers and 
Peacebuilding, edited by Charles T. Call, and Cedric de Coning, 129–165. Cham: Springer, 2017.
Soares de Lima, Maria Regina, and Mônica Hirst. “Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power: 
Action, Choice and Responsibilities.” International Affairs 82, no. 1 (2006): 21–40. 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2006.00513.x.
Swami, Praveen. 2014. “In a First, Modi Invites SAARC Leaders for His Swearing-In.” The Hindu, May 21. 
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/in-a-first-modi-invites-saarc-leaders-for-his-swear-
ingin/article6033710.ece
Taneja, Kabir. 2017. “India and the Afghan Taliban.” The Diplomat, November 30. https://thediplomat.
com/2017/11/india-and-the-afghan-taliban/
Tanham, George. “Indian Strategic Culture.” Washington Quarterly 15, no.1 (1992): 129–142. 
doi:10.1080/01636609209550082.
Tarapués Sandino, Diego Fernando. “Colombia y Brasil en la lucha contra el crimen transnacional: una 
revisión a sus posturas, acciones y estrategias de seguridad.” In Colombia y Brasil: ¿Socios estratégi-
cos en la construcción de Suramérica?, edited by eduardo Pastrana Buelvas, Stefan Jost; and Daniel 
Flemes, 423–52. Bogotá: editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 2012.
Wagner, Christian. “India’s Bilateral Security Relationship in South Asia.” Strategic Analysis 42, no. 1 
(2018): 15–28. doi:10.1080/09700161.2017.1418952.
Zoellick, Robert B. “Speech at George Washington University ahead of this year’s Annual Meetings 
Washington, United States.” September 14, 2011. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/speech/ 
2011/09/14/the-world-bank-group-president-robert-b-zoellick-speech-at-george-washington-
university-ahead-of-this-years-annual-meetings0.
